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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The rise of technology and its role in acts of terror, specifically the attacks 
in Paris on November 13, 2015, have reopened a longstanding debate on how 
state governments should regulate internet usage.1  As accessibility to 
technology increases, a complicated question arises: what is the proper method 
for governments to legislate the balance between national security and 
personal freedom when it comes to the internet?  The French government 
recently reacted to the killing of political cartoonists with a new law that 
regulates and collects data on French citizens.2  This Note will analyze whether 
the Loi Relative au Renseignement (Law Concerning Intelligence) infringes on 
basic rights guaranteed in the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(ECFR), beyond what is permitted under the margin of appreciation doctrine, 
so as to violate France’s requirements under the ECFR. 
Part One of this Note will examine the creation, implementation, and 
potential consequences of the Loi Relative au Renseignement, providing 
context to better understand the content of this law and how it will affect the 
lives of people using the internet in France.  Part Two will discuss the ECFR 
and its relevance to the controversy.  The most applicable rights to this 
discussion are an individual’s right to private and family life and the right to 
protection of personal data, found in Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR.3  As a 
member of the European Union, France is bound by the rules of the 
community and is subject to the rulings of the European Courts.  Part Three 
will analyze how the European Court of Justice, the highest European Union 
court, should rule on the validity of this law based on the text of the Articles, 
jurisprudence, and legislative history of the ECFR.  The European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights establishes all of the fundamental rights protected in the 
European Union.  If the European Commission should decide to bring France 
to the European Court of Justice, this Note concludes that the court would 
likely hold that Loi Relative au Renseignement violates France’s obligations 
to Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.4 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Damian Paletta, Paris Attack Reopens U.S. Privacy vs. Security Debate, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2015, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/11/16/paris-attack-reopens-u-s-privacy-vs-security-debate/. 
 2 See Szuskin & Kedrida, The French Sweeping Intelligence Law Goes into Effect!, 
LEXOLOGY, Aug. 4, 2015, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=694bce7d-5692-48a 
b-aa50-4ce4f6eafabb.  
 3 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR) No. 2000/C of Dec. 18, 2000, arts. 7, 8, 2010 
O.J. C 364 at 10. 
 4 There are several avenues for potential litigants in regards to this law. One option is for 
the European Commission to make a claim against France in the European Court of Justice. 
Another option is for a member state of the European Union to bring a claim against France in 
the European Court of Justice.  Further, any member or citizen of the European Union could 
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II.  STATEMENT OF FACTS: HISTORY, MOTIVES, AND CONSEQUENCES 
A.  Motive Behind the Creation of the Loi Relative au Renseignement 
On January 7, 2015, two members of Al-Qaeda entered the office of the 
satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, where they killed twelve people.5  The 
newspaper was targeted because it had published cartoons of the Prophet 
Muhammad.  The incident culminated in a shootout between the Al-Qaeda 
members and law enforcement.  The event shocked the French public.6  
Three days later, approximately 4 million people in Paris participated in a 
rally of national unity.7  Within two days, the Twitter hashtag #jesuischarlie 
had been tweeted over 5 million times.8  The rally and social media attention 
the shooting received were seen not only as a way to support the victims’ 
families, but also as a unified message from the French people in support of 
freedom of speech.  
A few months later, in May 2015, a bill entered the French Parliament 
seeking to regulate and collect data in order to combat terrorism.9  This bill 
was hotly contested by the French public, with some critics referring to it as 
the “French Patriot Act,” a reference to the United States’ Patriot Act that 
was passed in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.10  These critics claimed 
the law would create a police state in France that would rival the government 
in George Orwell’s 1984.11  Despite this criticism, by June 9, 2015, the 
French National Assembly and Senate passed the Projet de Loi Relative au 
Renseignment by an overwhelming majority.12  The law allows the French 
government to monitor internet usage through complicated algorithms, 
                                                                                                                   
make a claim against France in the European Court of Human Rights.  This paper will only 
analyze the first of these options.   
 5 Le Resume des Faits, LE PARISIEN (Jan. 16, 2015), http://atelier.leparisien.fr/sites/Je-Suis-
Charlie/les-faits/le-resume-des-faits.  
 6 Id.  
 7 Remi Piet, Why Satire is Holy to the French, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 14 2015), http://www.aljaze 
era.com/indepth/opinion/2015/01/why-satire-holy-french-islam-2015113124829607350.html.  
 8 #JeSuisCharlie Tweeted More than 5 Million Times, NEW DELHI TELEVISION LIMITED 
(Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/jesuischarlie-tweeted-more-than-5-million-
times-725090. 
 9 French Parliament Approves New Surveillance Rules, BRITISH BROADCASTING 
CORPORATION (May 6, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32587377. 
 10 Lawmakers Back Spy Bill Dubbed ‘French Patriot Act,’ FRANCE 24, (May 5, 2015), 
http://www.france24.com/en/20150505-lawmakers-back-spy-bill-dubbed-french-patriot-act. 
 11 Id.  See also French Lower House Passes Sweeping Security Bill Some Call Patriot Act à 
la française, FREE SPEECH RADIO NEWS (May 5, 2015), http://fsrn.org/2015/05/french-lower-
house-passes-sweeping-security-bill-some-call-patriot-act-francaise/.  
 12 French Senate Passes Intelligence Bill, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/french-senate-passes-intelligence-bill-1433872098. 
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commonly referred to as boites noires, or “black boxes,” based on an 
individual’s internet usage.13  This kind of technology is new and 
sophisticated, and therefore there is not a great deal of information available.  
Further, the details of the algorithm are classified, though internet service 
providers (ISPs) are required to use these algorithms and make the 
information readily available to French intelligence services.14  
The law also allows the French government to monitor a person’s web 
searches, e-mails, and mobile phone calls more intrusively than before, 
without requiring permission from a judge.15  Some of the more intrusive 
measures include planting cameras, microphones, and recording keystroke 
logs.16  The French Prime Minister bears ultimate responsibility for 
authorizing these measures.  The Prime Minister is required to consult with a 
new, nine-person body, known as the National Committee of Intelligence 
Techniques Control, before engaging in these types of surveillance 
techniques; however, he does not have to follow the Committee’s 
recommendations.  The panel is made up of two deputies, two senators, two 
members of the Couseil d’Etat or State Council, two judges, and an 
electronic communications expert.17 
B.  Public Backlash 
Hundreds of people attended protests in France leading up to the passage 
of this new law.18  Protesters claimed that the proposed vast unchecked 
                                                                                                                   
 13 Lawmakers Back Spy Bill Dubbed ‘French Patriot Act,’ FRANCE 24 (May 5, 2015), http:// 
www.france24.com/en/20150505-lawmakers-back-spy-bill-dubbed-french-patriot-act. 
 14 Id. Another criticism of this law is that the French government is forcing ISPs to 
implement automatic data-processing software that will sort through data and requiring them 
to make the information acquired by the software readily available at all times.  See Bertrand 
Liard & Alexis Tandeau, New French Act on Intelligence Services: Impacts on Technical 
Operators, WHITE & CASE TECHNOLOGY NEWSFLASH (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.whitecase. 
com/publications/article/new-french-act-intelligence-services-impacts-technical-operators.  
 15 Loi 2015-912 du 24 juillet 2015 de relative au renseignement [Law 2015-912, July 24, 
2015 Relating to Intelligence], JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], July 
26, 2015, p. 12735. 
 16 Angelique Chrisafis, France Passes New Surveillance Law in Wake of Charlie Hebdo 
Attack, THE GUARDIAN, May 5, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/05/franc 
e-passes-new-surveillance-law-in-wake-of-charlie-hebdo-attack. 
 17 Loi 2015-912 du 24 juillet 2015 de relative au renseignement [Law 2015-912, July 24, 
2015 Relating to Intelligence], JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA République Française [J.O.], July 26, 
2015, p. 12735 art. 831-1.  For more detailed information about the structure of the French 
parliament see FR. CONSTIT. Title IV arts. 24–33 (2008).  
 18 See French Privacy Advocates Protest New Spying Laws, RUSSIA TODAY (Apr. 14, 2015), 
https://www.rt.com/news/249409-france-protest-spying-bill/.  
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powers posed a threat to their civil liberties.19  Many human rights, internet 
rights, and civil rights groups joined the protests.  One such advocacy group, 
Quadrature du Net, wrote, “Representatives of the French people have given 
the Prime Minister the power to undertake massive and limitless surveillance 
of the population . . . by doing so, they’re ensuring the power of the state and 
the basis of our democratic system are getting ever more distant from one 
another.”20  Today, when so much of an individual’s personal and business 
lives are online, this message resonated with millions of French people, 
despite the law receiving overwhelming support in the French parliament. 
C.  French Constitutional Court  
The French Conseil Constitutionel, or Constitutional Court, is a body that 
decides whether a proposed law will go into effect.  Cases can come to the 
Constitutional Court upon recommendation arranged by French officials, 
including: the President; the Prime Minister; the President of the National 
Assembly; the President of the Senate; a group of sixty members of the 
National Assembly; a group of sixty members of the Senate; or in special 
circumstances, other French courts.21  If the Constitutional Court determines 
that a law violates the Constitution, the decision is binding and cannot be 
appealed.22  Since the Loi Relative au Renseigment sparked so much 
controversy, President François Hollande submitted it to the Constitutional 
Court before it was implemented.23  The Constitutional Court upheld the law 
on July 16, 2015, and it subsequently went into effect.24  However, the Court 
did hold two aspects of the law unconstitutional: first, the provision allowing 
surveillance by French intelligence services abroad; and second, the 
provision allowing authorities to bypass the Prime Minister and the National 
Committee of Intelligence Techniques Control in “emergency” situations.25  
The Constitutional Court was concerned that what qualified as an 
“emergency” situation was not defined and could potentially result in 
                                                                                                                   
 19 Id. 
 20 L’Assemblée nationale vote la surveillance de masse des citoyens français, LA 
QUADRATURE DU NET: INTERNET ET LIBERTÉS (May 5, 2015), https://www.laquadrature.net/fr/ 
lassemblee-nationale-vote-la-surveillance-de-masse-des-citoyens-francais. 
 21 2008 FR. CONST. Title VII Art. 61. 
 22 Id. art. 62.  
 23 Emile Picy & Leigh Thomas, French Constitutional Body Approves Eavesdropping Law, 
REUTERS, July 23, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-surveillance-idUSKCN0P 
X2QF20150723. 
 24  Id.  
 25 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2015-713 DC, July 23, 
2015, J.O. 0171 (Fr.). 
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executive abuse.  The French Constitutional Court upheld the rest of the law, 
including both the mass collection of metadata and the utilization of the law 
without the permission of a judge, even for the more serious surveillance 
measures. Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court was the last resort for 
French citizens to voice their concerns about the Loi Relative au 
Renseignement within France.  
D.  13/11 Terrorist Attacks in Paris 
On November 13, 2015, a terrorist group known as the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant claimed responsibility for a series of deadly assaults in 
Paris that killed more than 100 people.  Reports indicated that the massacre 
was the deadliest attack in France since World War II.26  The assailants 
directed their violence against civilian populations at a concert hall, a soccer 
game, and several restaurants.  After the fighting ended, France and the rest 
of the world were astonished at the carnage and grief-stricken with loss.  In 
the following days, France launched a military bombing of the Islamic 
State’s capital in Raqqa, Syria.27  France also called for a military coalition to 
remove the group from power.28  
France declared a state of emergency and also passed a law allowing that 
state of emergency to continue until February 2016.29  This law expanded the 
July 2015 Loi Relative au Renseignement, by allowing police to conduct 
physical searches of electronic items like personal computers without 
warrants.30  This law also allowed the government to conduct warrantless 
searches of homes and cars, strictly limit organized protests, and give the 
Prime Minister the power to immediately shutdown websites that are 
believed to pose a public security risk.31  Due to subsequent attacks in 
                                                                                                                   
 26 Lori Hinnant & Greg Keller, 120 Dead in Paris Attacks, Worst Since WWII, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/nationa-world/french-police-report-shoo 
tout-and-explosion-in-paris/. 
 27 John Irish & Gregory Blachier, ‘Spider in web’ Mastermind of Paris Attacks Killed in 
Raid, REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/11/20/us-france-shooting 
–idUSKCN0T22IU20151120#RowwFGMWOd5FzDct.97.  
 28 Id.  
 29 Loi 55-385 du 3 avril 1995 de relative à l’état d’urgence et renforçant l’efficacité de ses 
dispositions [Law 2015-912 of July 24, 2015 relating to the state of emergency and reinforcing 
the effectiveness of its positions], http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/projets/pl3225-ei.asp. 
 30 État d’urgence : l’État policier pour éluder tout bilan critique, QUADRATURE DU NET: 
INTERNET & LIBERTÉS, Nov. 19, 2015, https://www.laquadrature.net/fr/etat-urgence-etat-polic 
ier. 
 31 Loi 55-385 du 3 avril 1995, supra note 29. 
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France, the state of emergency has been extended until July 2017 after the 
next national elections.32  
E.  European Court of Justice  
After the original intelligence law went into effect in July 2015, the 
political climate in Europe changed significantly.  The November 2015 
terrorist attacks in France further solidified fears that France is at risk of 
another attack.  Despite the lack of relief in the national court system, there is 
still an avenue for individuals who believe that this law violates their civil 
rights.  Since all national resources have been exhausted, it is possible for the 
European Commission to bring suit against the French government in the 
European Court of Justice.  
The Loi Relative au Renseignement is being discussed by the Committee 
of Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament (the 
LIBE committee), after a request was made by members of the Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats, a transnational centrist liberal political party, in the 
European Parliament.33 The LIBE committee is a standing committee 
responsible for protecting the rights listed in the ECFR.  Of additional 
concern is whether the European Union buildings located in Strasbourg, 
France, are subject to the July 2015 surveillance law, because if they are, 
then the law would subject other countries’ sensitive information to French 
government surveillance.34  After a thorough investigation has been 
completed, the LIBE committee will determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence to support a claim that France has failed to meet its European 
Union legal obligations as required under the ECFR.  Many individuals have 
legitimate concerns about public security after the terrorist attacks in Paris, 
and if the LIBE committee chooses to bring a case against France for 
potential violations of their obligations under European Union law, the case 
could prove to be a historic opportunity for the court to show its commitment 
to the protection of fundamental rights.  
                                                                                                                   
 32 Nicolas Boring, France: State of Emergency Extended to July 2017, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/ar 
ticle/france-state-of-emergency-extended-to-july-2017/. 
 33 French Intelligence Law: European Commission Expresses “Serious Legal Concerns,” 
DIPLOMATIC INTELLIGENCE (June 26, 2015), http://www.diplomaticintelligence.eu/european-un 
ion-news/765-french-intelligence-law-european-commission-expresses-serious-legal-concerns. 
 34 Id. The Council of Europe and the European Parliament occupy buildings in Strasbourg.  
These buildings are international in nature, and collecting information through algorithms on 
world leaders in a space that is supposed to be reserved for diplomatic purposes may carry 
additional legal implications.  
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III.  STATEMENT OF APPLICABLE LAW: FRENCH LAW AND EUROPEAN UNION 
LAW 
A.  Loi Relative au Renseignement  
After the Constitutional Court upheld this legislation, the Loi Relative au 
Renseignement became law in France.  Its goal is to ensure the security of 
France against future terrorist threats.35   The law is designed to achieve this 
goal by using algorithms that allow the government to collect and analyze 
metadata through the internet.  Information relating to the operation and 
implementation of the algorithm will likely remain unavailable to the general 
public.36  The Loi Relative au Renseignement requires that ISPs allow the 
government to implement these algorithms on their networks and make the 
information collected available to the government.  The law specifically 
says, “for the sole purpose of preventing terrorism, it may be imposed on 
operators’ . . . automated processing networks, according to the parameters 
specified in the authorization, to detect likely connections that can reveal a 
terrorist threat.”37  A provision of the law also permits the government to use 
the algorithm to collect metadata that contains confidential information of 
lawyers, journalists, judges, and members of the legislature.38  This means 
that all French internet users are subject to government surveillance even 
without any evidence of wrongdoing on their parts.  
The law also requires that a nine-person panel, the National Committee of 
Intelligence Techniques Control, will be used to determine whether, based on 
the results of the algorithm, a subject of surveillance may be subjected to still 
more intrusive investigation.39  The Loi Relative au Renseignement states that 
members of this oversight board have specified term limits, and it is designed 
to ensure equal representation of men and women.40  Further, the law puts into 
place a system of communication between the National Committee of 
Intelligence Techniques Control and the Prime Minister.41  The oversight 
                                                                                                                   
 35 Loi 2015-912 du 24 juillet 2015 de relative au renseignement [Law 2015-912 of July 24, 
2015 Relating to Intelligence], JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], July 
26, 2015, p. 12735 art. 811-2. 
 36 Assemblée Nationale- 2e Séance du 2015, JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.], April 15, 2015, p. 4200.  
 37 Loi 2015-912 du 24 juillet 2015 de relative au renseignement [Law 2015-912, July 24, 
2015 Relating to Intelligence], JOURNAL OFFICIAL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], July 
26, 2015, p. 12735 art. 851-3. 
 38 Id. art. 821-7. 
 39 Id. art. 831-1.  For more detailed information about the structure of the French parliament 
see 2008 FR. CONST. Title IV art. 24-33.  
 40 Loi 2015-912 du 24 juillet 2015, supra note 37, art. 831-1. 
 41 Id. art. 833-4–833-11. 
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board is meant to act as a check on the Prime Minister’s power, but some find 
that it lacks effective democratic and judiciary mechanisms.  For example, 
French anti-terrorist judge Marc Trevidic stated, “These exorbitant powers will 
be without judicial review.  Do not lie to [the] French by presenting this 
project as an anti-terrorism law.  It opens the way to widespread intrusive 
methods, beyond the control of court judges, guarantors of individual freedoms 
in our country.”42  The National Committee of Intelligence Techniques 
Control’s lack of authority to stop the Prime Minister’s decision to conduct 
more aggressive surveillance measures may present another legal issue with 
regard to France’s European Union obligations.  
B.  European Court of Justice  
If the European Commission chooses to assert a claim against France in 
the European Court of Justice, the court will look to several sources of law, 
jurisprudence, and legal writings in making its final determination.  The 
court will likely look to Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR, the legislative history 
behind these Articles, and previous rulings by various European Union 
courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights. 
The Treaty Establishing the European Steel Community (now known as 
the Treaty of Paris 1951) brought about the creation of the European Court 
of Justice in 1952.43  The mission of the court is to interpret how the law 
should be followed and to ensure the law is observed equally among its 
treaty members.44  This court is the most powerful in the European Union, 
and it has the last word on the interpretation of European Union laws.45  
Since 1951, the role of the court has expanded as the European Union has 
grown.  The most notable of these expansions was achieved through 
Flamingo Costa v. ENEL, wherein the European Court of Justice established 
the supremacy of European Union law over that of its member states.46  This 
allows the court to make rulings that are binding on member states, including 
                                                                                                                   
 42 Eric Palletier, Projet de loi sur le renseignement: les réserves du juge antiterroriste Marc 
Trévidic, L’EXPRESS, Mar. 19, 2015, [“Ces pouvoirs exorbitants se feront sans contrôle 
judiciaire.  Ne mentons pas aux Français en présentant ce projet comme une loi antiterroriste. 
Il ouvre la voie à la généralisation de méthodes intrusives, hors du contrôle des juges 
judiciaires, pourtant garants des libertés individuelles dans notre pays”], http://www.lex 
press.fr/actualite/projet-de-loi-sur-le-renseignement-les-reserves-du-juge-antiterroriste-marc-tr 
evidic_1662838.html.  
 43 Treaty Establishing the European Steel Community, Arts. 31–48, Apr. 15, 1951, 261 
U.N.T.S. 140. 
 44 Id. art. 31. 
 45 Id. 
 46 594 Case 6/64, Flamingo Costa v. Enel, 1964 E.C.R. 585. 
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France, and to ensure compliance with European Union laws and treaties.  
Another significant European Union Court of Justice case was Van Gend en 
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen.47  In this case, the 
European Court of Justice held that the European Community can create 
rights for European Union citizens that can be enforced by member 
countries’ national courts.48  These rulings have made the court relevant in 
the member state’s national legal systems and are designed to create a more 
uniform system of governance among the European states.  
Since the European Court of Justice is considered to be the highest court, it 
can only hear cases if certain conditions are met.  First, the law of the member 
state must be in conflict with European Union law, and every other national 
avenue must be exhausted.49  Second, there are two types of claimants who can 
bring a suit to the European Court of Justice.  One is the European 
Commission.50  The members of European Commission are referred to as the 
“guardians of the treaty,” and they are responsible for monitoring member 
states to ensure compliance with the treaties of the European Union.51  The 
other is another member state could bring a claim against a country it alleges 
has violated European Union law.  This does not happen as often, however, 
due to potentially adverse political consequences.52 
C.  European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights 
The treaty that is the main focus of this Note is the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (ECFR).  As the European Union grew in membership, 
one major issue the community faced was how best to consolidate the 
member states’ legal systems into a harmonized regime, within which certain 
personal, political, civic, economic, and social rights were protected.53  The 
system previously in place was especially confusing for E.U. citizens, 
because there was no uniformity among members, and people were unsure of 
their rights.  Consequently, member states created the ECFR in 2000, to 
                                                                                                                   
 47 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 
E.C.R. 16.  
 48 Id. 
 49 Vaughne Miller, Taking a Complaint to the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
Library House of Commons (UK) SN/IA/5397 (Mar. 11, 2010), http://researchbriefings.Parlia 
ment.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05397#fullreport. 
 50 ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR ET AL., THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 210, 452–57 (Carolina 
Academic Press 2d ed. 2013).  
 51 Treaty of the European Union (Consolidated Version 2012) art. 17, Dec. 13, 2007, 298 
U.N.T.S. 3, 2012 O.J. (C 326).  
 52 LEVASSEUR ET AL., supra note 50, at 452.  
 53 Id.  
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delineate these rights more clearly.54  The ECFR has components that 
resemble a constitution, including a bill of rights and general principles for 
the European Union as a political entity.55  
A typical problem in a two-tiered style of government is balancing the 
division of power.  This stereotype held true for the European Union after the 
drafting of the ECFR.  Some European states expressed concern that the 
power of the European Union was encroaching on national rights.  After 
years of debate, the ECFR became binding in 2009, when the European 
Union adopted Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union.56  This treaty 
states, “the provisions of this Charter are addressed to institutions, bodies and 
organs of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiary and to the 
member states only when they are implementing Union law.”57  In other 
words, a violation of the ECFR can only be invoked when a member state is 
applying E.U. law or derogating from it.58  Article 6 also gave the ECFR the 
same legal force as a treaty.59  
The articles of the ECFR that are most relevant to the analysis of Loi 
Relative au Renseignment are Articles 7 and 8.  When the European Court of 
Justice is determinating the legality of the Loi Relative au Renseignement, it 
will likely look to the text of these articles along with other secondary 
authorities to aid in its interpretation of the law.60  In fact, the European 
Court of Justice held, in its 1974 judgment in Nold v. Commission of the 
European Communities, that it is “bound to draw inspiration from 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States,” and that, 
“international treaties for the protection of human rights, on which the 
member states have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply 
guidelines which should be followed within the framework of community 
law.”61  This language leaves a lot of potential for the use of persuasive 
authority that is often absent in other legal systems. 
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1.  Article 7 Analysis 
Article 7 requires European Union members to respect an individual’s 
private and family life. Specifically, Article 7 of the ECFR states that, 
“everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home, 
and communications.”62  This is particularly applicable in the context of the 
Loi Relative au Renseignment, which allows the government to monitor the 
activities of all French internet users.  This Article was written to protect 
individuals from expansive government intrusion.  
In 2003, the European Parliament created the European Union Network 
of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (NIEFR).63  This 
organization created a commentary that analyzes each article of the ECFR.  
This commentary spends some time discussing the significance of the word 
“communication” as used in Article 7.  This word is of particular importance, 
because in contrast to other human rights treaties that use more narrow 
language, the creators of the Charter use the word “communication” broadly, 
with the intent to adapt to changes in technology.64  Also, in comparison to 
other laws used in directives or other articles of this document, Article 7 uses 
expansive language, indicative of an expansive interpretation of this right.  
The European Court of Justice may also look to previous case law in its 
analysis of Article 7, including that of the European Court of Human Rights, 
which acts as persuasive authority for these purposes.  The European Court 
of Human Rights is a court established by the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and it rules on alleged violations of that Convention.  The 
European Court of Justice looks to the European Court of Human Rights 
partially because it often looks to similar questions of civil, political, social, 
and economic rights.  The European Court of Human Rights can only hear 
claims brought under the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights.65  
Since the adoption of the ECFR, however, the European Court of Justice has 
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frequently addressed human rights issues similar to those expressed in the 
European Convention on Human Rights.66 
Much of the case law suggests that the European Court of Human Rights 
has broadly interpreted the right to respect for private and family life.  For 
example, in Lopez Ostra v. Spain, the plaintiff asserted that her privacy rights 
were being violated because a government waste treatment plant was built 
only a few meters from her home, which greatly diminished her quality of 
life.67  In its 1994 judgment in the case, the European Court of Human Rights 
ruled that severe environmental pollution, such as that caused by a waste 
treatment plant, could have secondary effects which could inhibit a person’s 
right to private life.68  Therefore, an individual’s privacy rights could be 
violated, even through indirect means, if the government action was to 
interfere with his or her personal life choices.  
Another European Court of Human Rights case that presented a similar 
question was Klass v. Germany.69  The case involved the German 
government’s interception of phone conversations and inspections of mail, 
which it said were intended to protect German democratic society from 
threats to national security and other crimes.  In its 1978 decision, the 
European Court of Human Rights held it is sometimes necessary to conduct 
investigations of individuals secretly; however, in order to determine if a law 
violates an individual’s privacy rights the court must analyze, “the 
circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the 
possible measures, the grounds required for ordering such measures, the 
authorities competent to permit, carry out and supervise such measures, and 
the kind of remedy provided by the national law.”70  The court eventually 
held that the German law did not constitute a violation, reasoning that, first, 
there was a strict time limit for the collection and retention of personal 
information, and second, the cases were subject to judicial review.71 
These judgments show that although an individual’s right to privacy is 
designed to be interpreted expansively, there is latitude for member states to 
maneuver.  The jurisprudence also highlights the importance of 
communication between a government and its citizens.  These cases indicate 
data collection is not necessarily an evil, so long as, first, the state clearly 
                                                                                                                   
 66 Elena Both, The Roles and Relationship between the Two European Courts in Post-
Lisbon EU Human Rights Protection, JURIST (Sept. 12, 2013), http://jurist.org/dateline/2013/0 
9/elena-butti-lisbon-treaty.php.  
 67 Lopez Ostra v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90, Eur. Ct. H.R. 5 (1994). 
 68 Id.  
 69 Klass v. Germany, App No. 5029/71, 71 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) at 18-19 (1978). 
 70 Id.  
 71 Id. at 9.  
2017] CYBERSECURITY AND INTERNET RIGHTS 623 
 
communicates how the data will be used, and second, the state provides a 
proper independent mechanism for review.  
The European Court of Justice could also look to Article 17 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights for guidance, because 
France is a party to this treaty.72  Article 17 says, “No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”73  In 
other words, a government cannot indiscriminately interfere with individuals’ 
private lives.  The 2008 General Comments, accepted by the Human Rights 
Committee, say that for a government provision to not be arbitrary or 
unlawful, the law must be legal, meaning it does insofar as to not violate other 
international law provisions, was created to further the goals of the Covenant, 
and is reasonable under the circumstances.74  The comments further state that 
the law must state in detail exactly when and how the interferences will be 
permitted.75  Due to the similarity in phrasing between Article 17 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 7 of the 
ECFR, Article 17 may provide a useful aid in understanding an individual’s 
right to privacy.76  
From the cases, treaties, and commentaries, there is a general consensus 
on what factors the court will likely use in determining whether the Loi 
Relative au Renseignement violates Article 7 of the ECFR.  These factors 
will likely include the duration for which an individual is placed under 
surveillance, the period of time for which the information taken from that 
surveillance will be stored, the scope of the surveillance, and the overall 
reasonableness of the member state’s legislation.  The disputed area the court 
will have to define is where states draw the line between personal freedom 
and national security.  
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2.  Article 8 Analysis  
The court may also find the Loi Relative au Renseignement violates 
Article 8 of the ECFR.  Article 8 states the following:  
Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning him or her.  Such data must be processed fairly for 
specified purposes and on the basis of consent of the person 
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.  
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been 
collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it 
rectified.  Compliance with these rules shall be subject to 
control by an independent authority.77 
This Article was specifically created to modernize privacy rights by 
protecting individuals from intrusive government monitoring.  In order to 
more fully grasp this Article, the European Court of Justice will likely look 
at the text of the Article itself, the commentaries, European Union 
Parliament’s legislation on this Article, and various case law. 
NIEFR issued another comment in 2002 in response to the World Trade 
Center attacks on September 11, 2001.  This commentary examines the 
balance needed in order to safeguard civil liberties guaranteed by the ECFR 
while also protecting individuals from terrorist threats.78  In this comment, the 
organization focused heavily on the criteria necessary to retain an individual’s 
personal information in light of the rights guaranteed to a person by the ECFR.  
Specifically, the data retention needs to be: for a specified time, for justified 
grounds, and monitored by an independent control authority in order to 
preserve the democratic integrity of the European Union.79  
Another interpretative aid the court will likely use is European Union 
Parliament legislation. The European Parliament passed Directive 95/46/EC 
with the purpose of protecting European Union citizens with respect to the 
processing and collecting of personal data.80  Since this directive was passed 
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in 1995, there has been discussion in the European Union about updating the 
directive because of technological advances.81  The directive says a 
government needs to meet seven criteria in order to collect an individual’s 
personal data: first, it must provide notice that it is collecting an individual’s 
personal data; second, the collection must be for a legitimate purpose; third, 
the subject of the data collection must give their consent; fourth, the data 
collected must be secure; fifth, the subject of the data collection must know 
who has his or her information; sixth, the subject of the data collection must 
have access to their data; and seventh, any organizations violating these 
principles must be held accountable.82  The directive also defines the term 
“personal data” broadly, so as to afford more expansive rights.  It describes 
personal data as any information that can be reasonably linked to a particular 
individual.83  But this directive includes exceptions in order to combat 
potential threats to European Union security.  Some of these exceptions 
include: national security, defense, public security, prosecution of criminal 
offenses, and certain economic interests of the state.84  The competing 
interests between civil liberties and public security since then have been 
treated like a balancing test weighed by European courts like the European 
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice.  Although this 
directive lays out factors for courts to consider, its exceptions require the 
court to determine the validity of national laws on a case-by-case basis, 
which can often leave room for confusion among member states.  
The European Court of Human Rights addressed the issue of personal 
data collection in 2000 in Rotaru v. Romania.  There, a Romanian citizen 
brought a claim arguing that Romania’s collection and use of his personal 
data was a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.85  Some of the personal data at issue in this case included the 
applicant’s political writings before the collapse of Romania’s Stalinist 
government, and incorrect information which affiliated him with a violent 
political group known as the Legionaries.86  Article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, similar to Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR, 
indicates that everyone has a right to private life.87  
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In its 2000 judgment, the European Court of Human Rights held the 
Romanian law violated Article 8 because the “domestic law was not 
sufficiently precise to indicate to citizens in what circumstances and on what 
terms the public authorities were empowered to file information on their 
private life and make use of it.”88  The court also held that the domestic law 
was not specific enough in how the government will use its data collection 
power, and there were not any safeguards against the potential abuse of this 
power.89   
The Council of Europe indicated in both the ECFR and the European 
Convention on Human Rights that widespread and unchecked surveillance 
can become a governmental tool for oppression.  Considering Europe’s 
history of communism and fascism in the early twentieth century, this 
concern is legitimate.  The judgment in Rotaru v. Romania indicated that in 
order to make a data-collection law legal, the state must include certain 
precautions to ensure the rights of European Union citizens are protected.  
One of these precautions is a clear message of what information is being 
collected and how it will be used by the member state’s government.  Failing 
to meet these requirements would be unjust, because it would render the data 
collection process completely arbitrary.  This could potentially result in a 
state where everyone is subject to punishment for political, economic, or 
cultural views.90  Further, the court emphasized the value of proper 
safeguards to ensure the purpose declared in the state law is being 
followed.91  Without proper checks on government authority, there is little 
assurance that the data collection is being used legitimately.  
The court will also likely look to Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister of 
Communications.92  In this European Court of Justice 2004 action, the Irish 
High Court and the Austrian Constitutional Court asked for a preliminary 
ruling on Directive 2006/24 created by the European Parliament.  Directive 
2006/24 was created in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
in the United States.  The directive allowed governments to collect data on an 
unlimited number of people and to store that data for an extended period of 
time, with the stated purpose of combating the threat posed by global 
terrorism.93  The European Court of Justice found that the directive interfered 
with the European Union citizen’s right to protection of their personal data 
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under Article 8 of the ECFR.94  It also analyzed whether this directive met a 
public security exception.  As mentioned previously, if a state is implementing 
a data-collection policy designed to counter crimes like terrorism, there is 
more flexibility in the ECFR.  The court found the law in question did meet an 
exception, because the directive protected a legitimate interest: an individual’s 
right to security, which is also protected by the ECFR.95  
The next issue the court analyzed in its judgment in Digital Rights Ireland 
was whether the law was a proportional response to the security interest in 
light of Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR.  In this part of the opinion, the court 
analyzed to what degree the law was an acceptable way to achieve its purpose 
and whether the methods it implemented were necessary.  The court wrote that 
considering the seriousness of the violation of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, 
the standard should be strict.96  The court held that the generalized surveillance 
measures allowed in this directive were not necessary, because the surveillance 
measures did not require a link between the criminal activity that they were 
monitoring and the subject of the surveillance.97  This generalized 
governmental surveillance could not be allowed because it essentially put 
everyone in the European Union under the microscope of the government.  
Further, the court held, there were improper safety mechanisms in place to 
ensure the data would be used for a legitimate purpose.98  
This case indicates that member states have the ability to create policies 
to protect their vital security interests, but that those interests must be 
weighed against the fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the 
ECFR.  Some elements to consider in this test are the seriousness of the 
threat posed, on the one hand, and the extent to which individual freedoms 
will be compromised, on the other.  The judgment in Digital Rights Ireland, 
in particular, suggests the number of individuals being surveilled by the 
government is important in determining whether the data collection is unfair 
and arbitrary.  Thus, when there are more people placed under surveillance 
there must also be a greater security interest. 
3.  Margin of Appreciation Analysis 
The margin of appreciation doctrine allows states to have room to 
maneuver when it comes to developing state policy in order to implement 
European Union laws.  Specifically, the Council of Europe stated in an 
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Explanatory Report on Protocol that, “State Parties enjoy a margin of 
appreciation in how they apply and implement the Convention, depending on 
the circumstances of the case and the rights and freedoms engaged.”99  This 
doctrine was originally used in the European Court of Human Rights, but the 
European Court of Justice has also since adopted it.100  There is often conflict 
when a two-tiered system is implemented between the state governments and 
the federation of states as a whole.  In the case of the European Union, a 
source of tension between the community and the member states is that the 
community wants to develop a more uniform system of laws and regulations 
while states want to retain their sovereignty.  The margin of appreciation 
doctrine offers a potential solution to this problem.  
Some areas of the law allow more flexibility than others.  These include 
public emergency, national security, protection of public morals, and 
legislative implementation of social and economic policies.101  States also 
have more leeway when there is no universal consensus within the European 
Union, or if a state is trying to balance two competing rights.102  The margin 
of appreciation doctrine is more open to these kinds of policies because 
certain regulations are sometimes necessary for security reasons that ensure 
the survival of the state.  Also, states might be better qualified to make 
certain kinds of legislation because they are in “direct, continuous contact 
with the realities of the country” and can more accurately strike a balance 
between social needs.103  When the European Court of Justice has to make 
rulings on whether or not a state policy violates European Union law it will 
likely analyze whether it fits into one of these categories. 
Other kinds of state laws have a narrower margin of appreciation.  
Examples include when a person’s identity or existence is at stake, a person’s 
absolute rights are compromised, a law promotes racial or ethnic 
discrimination, or a law seeks to regulate an “intimate aspect of private 
life.”104  In these cases, the European courts are much less flexible because 
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there is a strong interest in promoting policy that guarantees the greatest 
amount of personal freedom and that protects individuals from those in 
power who may want to take advantage of political, ethnic, and racial 
minorities.  The analysis becomes more complicated, however, when there 
are two fundamental rights directly at odds with each other.  
IV.  DISCUSSION: EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE INQUIRY  
This Note will next discuss how the European Court of Justice might rule 
if the Loi Relative au Renseignement was brought before it, considering the 
jurisprudence and the facts of this particular case. The first part of this 
section will analyze whether the Loi Relative au Renseignement violates 
Article 7 of the ECFR.  The second part will discuss whether or not it 
violates Article 8.  After looking at the facts of the case and the applicable 
law, the European Court of Justice will probably find this law violates 
Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR.  So, the third part of the discussion will try to 
determine if the law meets any of the enumerated exceptions in Articles 7 
and 8.  Finally, the fourth part will analyze whether the margin of 
appreciation doctrine provides enough latitude for the French government to 
keep their law even though it conflicts with the European Union obligations. 
A.  Does the French Law Violate Article 7? 
Article 7 indicates that every individual has a right to private life.  This 
right to not be interfered with has been the subject of a great deal of litigation 
and analysis.105  If the European Commission were to bring a claim against 
France in the European Court of Justice, the Commission would likely claim 
that France had violated its obligations to be in compliance with the ECFR 
under Article 7.  France would probably argue that this law is specific 
enough and has adequate safeguards to avoid violation.  When determining 
whether the Loi Relative au Renseignement encroaches upon an individual’s 
right to private life, special consideration must be given to the jurisprudence. 
1.  Arbitrary use of Surveillance  
If the European Commission chooses to bring a suit against France to the 
European Court of Justice, the Commission will claim the Loi Relative au 
Renseignement violates Article 7 in several ways.  One of these is that 
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running all metadata used by French citizens through algorithms without 
discrimination is an interference with private life because personal 
information is being collected arbitrarily.  The Commission will contend that 
screening the entirety of the French population to search for a fraction of the 
minority of persons who may attack the state is unfair in that it will force the 
rest of internet users to be subject to expansive police powers.  Although 
certain qualifications must be met to further analyze the collected metadata, 
the collection of such information in the first place is an interference with the 
French population’s privacy rights, and there is no way to check the power of 
French intelligence agencies.   
The French government could argue this law does impose certain limits 
on the collected data. It might also assert that the collection of metadata 
alone should not be considered an interference with a person’s fundamental 
rights, because simply holding the information for a specific period of time 
does not prevent the subject of the surveillance from accessing the 
information.  Nor does the law allow intelligence services to use the data.  
Further, France will probably say that the complex algorithms do initially 
screen all of the data, but this information is not used unless certain 
qualifications are met.  So, the search for information relating to a potential 
terrorist threat is not arbitrary. 
In Klass v. Germany the European Court of Human Rights held the 
German government could collect data of a German citizen because there 
was a judicial measure in place that checked the power of intelligence 
agencies.106  France will probably say in the case of the Loi Relative au 
Renseignement, all metadata is put through an algorithm without judicial 
discretion or control, but there are checks on more invasive measures of data 
collection because the National Committee of Intelligence Techniques 
Control reviews cases and gives a recommendation on an individual basis.107  
Further, the Prime Minister acts as a final check because he makes the final 
decision as to whether more invasive measures will be implemented.108 
The European Court of Justice will probably find that the widespread 
collection of metadata for the purpose of putting it through an algorithm 
conflicts with an individual’s right to a private life.  Metadata alone may not 
necessarily give a lay-person enough data to link the information to an 
individual, but the information in metadata can be easily processed by an 
intelligence agency in order to reveal personal data that links directly to an 
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individual.109  Since the information is being collected from all internet users 
in France and not only individuals who are suspected of committing criminal 
offenses, it seems to be an over inclusive policy that is only going to capture 
a small segment of the population while jeopardizing most people’s 
individual liberties.  
2.  Lack of Governmental Transparency   
The European Commission also might claim that there is no limit to how 
much information is being collected on an individual subject of surveillance.  
This results in uncertainty among internet users, and necessarily interferes 
with their private lives.  Since only specific members of French intelligence 
agencies know how the algorithm works or what makes a French internet 
user subject to more intrusive measures of surveillance, the Loi Relative au 
Renseignement could discourage people from making statements that could 
be interpreted as against the French government.  This kind of unregulated 
authority could end in a violation of a person’s privacy rights, especially if a 
person may be subject to government monitoring for comments made in the 
private sphere.  
The government might reply to this claim by saying that the algorithms 
used to screen the metadata are advanced and complex, and are designed to 
determine whether a surveillance subject’s internet usage indicates that he or 
she would be a terrorist threat.110  So, the fear that French intelligence 
services will use this power to quash political dissidents is not valid. 
This question will be particularly difficult for the European Court of Justice 
because the issue of whether an algorithm that detects signs of terrorist 
sentiment is a sufficient measure of security has never been presented to the 
European Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights before.  
The European Court of Justice, in its 2014 judgment in Digital Rights Ireland 
Ltd. v. Minister of Communications, did hold that widespread surveillance of a 
population without checks on government power violates the individual’s right 
to privacy.111  But, the European Court of Human Rights in its 1978 judgment 
Klass and Others v. Germany determined that in other instances a government 
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can collect more intimate data if there is just cause and proper evidence to 
support a more detailed investigation.112 
Despite the arguments on both sides, the European Court of Justice will 
most likely find that these algorithms are not an appropriate measure to 
protect individuals from government intrusion into the privacy rights 
guaranteed by the ECFR.  One of the main issues the European Court of 
Justice will have is that no one with actual independent authority can control 
the actions of the Prime Minister.113  The French government could actually 
be screening for anything, and there is no governmental check on the 
intelligence agencies who are collecting data.  Some of the information 
analyzed could be completely irrelevant to the prevention of terrorism.  
Another reason why the European Court of Justice may find these 
algorithms to be an ineffective protection is because the algorithm, which is 
designed to act as a screen, does not actually protect an individual until after 
their metadata has already been collected and analyzed.  One could argue 
there is an inherent violation of an individual’s right to privacy, however, 
simply from the mere collection and storage of the data.114 
3.  Adequate Safeguards 
The Commission should argue that the security measures that have been 
implemented to prevent the abuse of this authority are too few and lack 
transparency.  Unlike surveillance laws in other countries, which require 
permission from a judge before engaging in what are arguably more intrusive 
surveillance practices, this law requires only the permission of the Prime 
Minister.115  Further, although there are two judges on the National 
Committee of Intelligence Techniques Control, their opinions are neither 
binding nor enforceable and do not provide an effective check on the Prime 
Minister’s authority.  
The French government could reply by saying the Constitutional Court has 
already taken these concerns into account and has required the Prime Minister 
to seek the opinion of the National Committee of Intelligence Techniques 
Control before making a determination about engaging in more serious 
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surveillance measures.116  Another argument the French government could 
make is that the Prime Minister is elected by the people, and the democratic 
process is a powerful check on the abuse of authority.  In short, if the people 
do not want to have this law, they should go through democratic means to get 
it removed.  Since the Prime Minister and the people’s elected representatives 
in Parliament overwhelmingly support this piece of legislation, the European 
Union should respect the decisions of the French government.  
The European Court of Justice will probably find the lack of oversight is 
the greatest weakness in the Loi Relative au Renseignement.  Although the 
French government can make several compelling arguments, the National 
Committee of Intelligence Techniques Control’s lack of enforcement power 
and the absence of any judicial authority could allow arbitrary abuse of an 
individual’s right to privacy.  Also, democracy is a powerful tool in ensuring 
people have an avenue to participate in government, but the democratic 
process is not perfect.  So, individuals need an independent judiciary to 
protect the rights of people who may not be in the majority. 
B.  Does the French Law Violate Article 8?  
The next issue the European Court of Justice will have to analyze is 
whether the Loi Relative au Renseignement is in violation of Article 8 of the 
ECFR.  Article 8 says everyone has a right to protection of personal data, and 
that data has to be processed fairly for specific purposes on the basis of 
consent or a legitimate law.117  Also, people have a right to access data 
collected and a right to have incorrect data rectified.118  
The major issue the European Court of Justice will have to analyze in 
regard to the Loi Relative au Renseignement is this law’s procedure.  Article 
8’s primary focus is on the process by which the data is collected.119  The 
court has held previously and research suggests that data can be collected in 
vast amounts if the process is fair and there are adequate safeguards to 
prevent abuse.120  The European Court of Justice will likely find that this vast 
data collection, without discrimination, is not a fair process of surveillance, 
and this law violates Article 8 of the ECFR.  
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1.  Right of Access 
The right of access to one’s personal data is specifically mentioned in 
Article 8(2) of the ECFR.121  The right to know one’s data is being processed 
and the right to challenge the validity of the government’s collections of data 
is an integral part of the right to protection of personal data. 
The Commission will likely argue a major issue with the French law is 
that the process of mass surveillance is not fair because the information is 
being processed without the knowledge or consent of the subjects of 
surveillance.  The law does not provide any avenues for French citizens to 
know what data is being collected or put through the government’s 
algorithm.  The European Commission may use the holding of the European 
Court of Justice in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister of Communications 
by arguing that the court paid special attention to the fact the subjects of 
surveillance themselves would not be aware they were being analyzed by 
intelligence agencies and therefore could not argue to any legitimate 
authority that their data was being processed unfairly or without cause.122  
Without such knowledge, individuals do not have a legitimate way to defend 
themselves if the government decides to implement more intrusive 
surveillance measures. 
The French government will likely reply by arguing that the law was 
originally designed to combat terrorism.123  Allowing everyone to know what 
data is being collected and when an individual is subject to more intrusive 
surveillance measures would undermine the purpose of the law.  If people 
could bring claims against the French government, potential terrorists would 
eventually learn how to conduct their illegal activities around the protection 
of the algorithm.  The more information there is available about how the 
French government conducts their secret surveillance, the more likely it 
would be that terrorist threats could exploit this information to hurt French 
citizens.  Further, there is an avenue where a person can simply request 
information about whether the National Committee of Intelligence 
Techniques Control has engaged in intrusive methods on a person 
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individually.124  Although this does not allow for instant right of access, a 
person does still have an avenue to seek redress.  
2.  Specificity   
The Commission could also argue that the data is not being collected for 
specific purposes and does not allow for any sort of exceptions.  For 
example, the law does not allow exceptions for journalists who may have 
private information about anonymous sources.125  This information will also 
be collected and potentially analyzed without discernment from other data.126  
Another example of the lack of discrimination is potential communications 
between clients and their attorneys.127  As technology has progressed, many 
lawyers have turned to the internet to communicate more efficiently with 
their clients.  This law potentially puts confidential attorney-client 
communications in the government’s possession.  In the case of the Loi 
Relative au Renseignement, these potentially confidential discussions will 
also be subject to the surveillance law and can be monitored by the 
government without the consent of surveillance subjects.  This is a violation 
of a person’s rights under Article 8 because the law is not specific enough to 
take these especially serious privacy concerns into account.128  The generality 
of the surveillance law subjects individuals to arbitrary enforcement; 
therefore, it violates Article 8 of the Charter.  
The French government could respond to this argument in several ways.  
They could claim the collection of metadata is a nominal invasion of privacy 
rights because the data will not be used unless they meet certain 
qualifications required by the algorithm.  Further, by using an algorithm as a 
specific discriminatory filter, intelligence services are prevented from 
engaging in unfair surveillance practices.  In short, the French government is 
directly targeting potential terrorist threats from metadata. 
The French government can also argue that metadata is a specific type of 
data, and this targeted approach shows the government’s intent to only look 
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at certain data for a specific reason.  Metadata is a description of actual data, 
and metadata alone does not tell an individual much unless they are 
processed to the point where they actually recreate what is essentially a copy 
of a person’s personal data.129  The French government is not going to be 
putting raw data together unless: first, the algorithm indicates the subject of 
surveillance is a potential threat to the French people; second, the National 
Committee of Intelligence Techniques Control gives an opinion on whether 
more serious surveillance methods should be used; and third, the Prime 
Minister renders a final decision that, based off the data collected, an 
individual poses a terrorist threat.  
The European Court of Justice will probably find this to be one of the 
more difficult issues to analyze, but in the end, it should find the collection 
and processing of metadata does violate Article 8.  The use of metadata for 
security purposes is a relatively new phenomenon in comparison to more 
traditional methods of surveillance such as wiretaps, videotaping, and even 
hacking into individual’s computers to read e-mails.  The European Court of 
Justice may take a new approach and find metadata is too unsophisticated to 
be considered in the same category as personal data.  Although having access 
to an individual’s metadata creates the potential for state abuse, this potential 
may not become a reality, because the law indicates that metadata will 
exclusively be used for the purpose of stopping terrorism.130 
By accepting this argument, the European Court of Justice would have to 
overcome the logic that it utilized in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister of 
Communications, when it held that the storage of metadata did violate an 
individual’s privacy rights because it allowed for the potential to create 
personal data.131  This indicates that metadata can be considered personal 
data in that they can be used to link raw information to a particular 
individual.  Even though the algorithm acts as a filter, simply having access 
to data capable of being manifested into information that can be directed at 
an individual in particular is still a violation of Article 8.   
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3.  Independent Authority 
Article 8(3) of the ECFR says compliance with Article 8 by an independent 
authority is also a fundamental right.132  Accordingly, another argument the 
European Commission could make is that the National Committee of 
Intelligence Techniques Control is not an independent authority that controls 
the French government’s surveillance.  Although the French law does try to 
ensure the board is independent by taking actions such as term limits, 
proportional representation based off of political parties and gender, and 
ensuring two judges are on the panels at all times, the Loi Relative au 
Renseignement fails to give the National Committee of Intelligence 
Techniques Control any authority in the surveillance decisions.133  
When it comes to this argument, France would have difficulty trying to 
convince the European Court of Justice that a capable independent body 
exists to control the government’s use of surveillance, as required in Article 
8(3) of the ECFR.  Therefore, at this point France may have to turn to some 
of the exceptions that are indicated in Directive 95/46/EC. 
C.  Does the Law Meet any Exceptions? 
Directive 95/46/EC provides that under certain circumstances a 
government can be allowed to collect an individual’s personal data and 
infringe on an individual’s right to privacy.  These exceptions include 
national security purposes, defense, public security, prosecution of criminal 
offenses, and certain economic interests of the state.134  In order to use these 
exceptions to justify infringement on an individual’s personal rights, 
however, the government must balance the interests of the state and of the 
individual when creating laws.  If the European Court of Justice does hear a 
claim brought by the European Commission, the court will have to 
implement this balancing test.  
France will argue that the Loi Relative au Renseignement is designed to 
combat a real and active terrorist threat that puts the country’s citizens in 
danger.  The law specifically states that it is designed to prevent terrorist 
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attacks on government institutions and the French public.135  It is also 
designed to prevent organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.136  The goal of the law is focused and designed to prevent 
harm to French citizens.  So, the French government is justified in 
implementing the contents of this law in order to keep the French people safe 
from this mounting threat. 
France will likely claim that in this past year France has experienced a 
rise in terrorist attacks, and France is perpetually exposed to radical 
individuals who threaten the French way of life.137  After the Charlie Hebdo 
attacks of January 2015 there was another terrorist attack on November 13, 
2015.  The latter was the deadliest yet, resulting in over a hundred civilian 
casualties.  The original threat that was used as justification to pass the Loi 
Relative au Renseignement has manifested into a reality that will forever 
change how France addresses terrorism.  
The issue of modern terrorism causes concerns for France because the 
internet is now being used by terrorist organizations like the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant to recruit cyberjihadists from around the world.138  The 
French government could further state that the fight against terrorism is 
unique and requires a different method of defense than traditional armed 
conflicts.  Unlike conflicts between countries, the conflict between terrorist 
organizations and the French public does not involve formal military units.  
In this case, terrorists can be people who have no military experience, living 
seemingly innocuous lives.  
The nature of this kind of conflict makes it difficult for governments to 
detect threats before they happen.  It is also more severe than traditional armed 
conflict because the intended targets of terrorist attacks are civilians, and the 
individual terrorists often reside, in some capacity, in the state they wish to 
attack.  Consequently, more innovative measures, like the ones implemented in 
the Loi Relative au Renseignement, are necessary to thwart the plots of 
individuals who are determined to put an end to the French way of life.  
France can also argue that it did take into account individual liberties, 
because France recognizes that implementing new security measures often 
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calls for reassurance by the government that this new power will be curtailed 
by procedural and judicial safeguards.  One of the measures the French 
government has taken is forbidding the government from monitoring French 
people with regard to politics, public debate, and the media.139  The law also 
allows French people to seek redress through the French court system if they 
believe the surveillance measures used on their personal data were 
unjustified.140  In short, France would answer by drawing attention to the fact 
that the Loi Relative au Renseignement does seek to strike a balance in the 
freedom versus security dilemma that has plagued democracies since their 
inceptions.  
France will likely say that it did take individual liberty interests into 
account when creating this law, but in this case because the security interest 
is so serious, an individual’s liberty interest must make some space to allow 
for protection of the public welfare.  The rise of technology has pressured 
governments to take more serious measures to protect their citizens, and 
perhaps using the technology—for instance by the use of algorithms—is the 
best way to combat the technology used to perpetuate violence. 
It seems unlikely that the European Commission will bring a case against 
the government of France considering how recent the 13/11 terrorist attacks 
took place.  Further, the European Commission may have a stronger 
argument for removing the Loi Relative au Renseignment if it waits until 
after France is no longer in a state of emergency.  Regardless of when the 
European Commission brings suit, it will have compelling arguments 
regarding the disproportionate effects on law abiding citizens and the lack of 
safeguards of this law.  
The European Commission will respond by acknowledging that the 
security concern is a legitimate interest, but that France’s method of 
combatting terrorism has a disproportionate effect on the French public, one 
that renders the law unjustifiable and violates Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR.  
Although there are exceptions to Directive 95/46/EC, these exceptions must 
be weighed against, and only implemented in light of, the seven principles 
needed to collect an individual’s personal data.  These seven principles are: 
there must be notice of collection of personal data, the collection must be for 
a legitimate purpose, the subject of data must give their consent, the data 
collected should be secure, the subject of collection should know who has his 
or her information, the subject should also have access to their data, and any 
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organizations violating these principles should be held accountable.141  The 
European Commission will argue that the French government failed to 
balance these seven principles.  The law does not give the subject of the 
surveillance notice of collection of data when the government implements 
more intrusive surveillance measures.  Although the subject of the collection 
can appeal the surveillance measures, the subject would have no reason to 
believe the government is implementing these more serious measures unless 
the person was able to discover this on his or her own.142  A grave 
shortcoming of the Loi Relative au Renseignement is that the law does not 
seem to mitigate this notification principle.  
Also, the law does not ask for the surveillance subject’s consent before 
processing that person’s data.  This expansive government policy collects all 
French internet users’ data, and then the Prime Minister determines if 
additional surveillance techniques need to be applied.  The French 
government could argue that it had the consent of the people to create this 
law democratically.  This would not be a compelling argument because of 
the public opposition, and one cannot get consent to violate an individual’s 
fundamental rights through a representative in the legislature.  
The European Commission will also argue that a major flaw of this law is 
that there are several principles that are not addressed.  The law fails to discuss 
how it will ensure that the data collected will be secured or what agencies will 
have access to the data besides the Prime Minister and the National Committee 
of Intelligence Techniques Control.143  These failures to legislate particularities 
in regard to these principles call into question the fairness of a law that 
proposes searching for a small minority of people who may be potential 
internet using terrorists by monitoring the French public indiscriminately. 
The lack of judicial control over the Prime Minister’s decisions gives him 
control over a large amount of data with no check on his authority.  The Loi 
Relative au Renseignement indicates that the Prime Minister can exclusively 
use the information gathered through the algorithms in order to combat 
terrorist threats, but if the Prime Minister chooses to use this information for 
more illegitimate purposes there is no system in place to hold him 
accountable.144  
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The National Committee of Intelligence Techniques Control is an 
ineffective group to hold the Prime Minister accountable or limit the scope of 
the surveillance techniques because its decisions have no binding authority.  
Further, the decisions of the Prime Minster and the recommendations of the 
National Committee of Intelligence Techniques Control are considered state 
secrets.  According to the law the French people are required to receive a 
yearly report in which the National Committee of Intelligence Techniques 
Control reveals how many times the more serious surveillance techniques are 
used by intelligence services.145  The law fails in specificity because there is 
never any disclosure of who the techniques were used upon, what evidence 
was used to determine these additional measures were necessary, or whether 
the use of these techniques were implemented for political motivations.146  
The European Commission will likely argue that the lack of effective 
judicial safeguards makes this law in violation of the ECFR, even when the 
public and national security exception is brought into play.  The threat of 
terrorism is a part of governance; all governments are potential targets of 
terrorist attacks, and the risk of terrorism is a part of ruling and living in 
modern society.  This threat cannot be used as a justification to forgo the 
foundations of the European Union, and cannot be used to compromise the 
fundamental freedoms of privacy and protection of personal data.  
D.  Will the Law be Upheld under the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine? 
At this point the European Court of Justice will likely have to conduct a 
margin of appreciation analysis.  The margin of appreciation doctrine allows 
members of the European Union to have some latitude when it comes to 
developing state policy in order to implement European Union laws.147  As 
mentioned previously, the European courts often allow for a wide margin of 
appreciation under certain circumstances.  France will likely say it should 
have a larger margin of appreciation because the Loi Relative au 
Renseignement was created for national security purposes.148  The European 
Commission will probably reply by saying the court should use a narrower 
margin of appreciation because the law compromises a person’s absolute 
rights and seeks to regulate an intimate aspect of private life.149  
In the end, their arguments will still come down to one issue: whether the 
Loi Relative au Renseignement encroaches on the fundamental rights 
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guaranteed in Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR beyond what is permitted under 
the margin of appreciation doctrine to violate France’s obligations under the 
ECFR.  All things considered, the European Court of Justice will likely find 
that even with the margin of appreciation as a means for more flexibility with 
member states, there are still insufficient safeguards to protect French 
citizens’ fundamental rights.  The previously mentioned case law indicates 
that if there is a clear communication of how the data will be used, and there 
is a proper independent mechanism for review, then it will likely not violate 
a member state’s obligations to the European Union.  
The European Court of Justice may consider offering suggestions to the 
French government on how to mitigate the Loi Relative au Renseignement’s 
encroachment on civil liberties.  One way the court could do this would be by 
suggesting that the French government make the National Committee of 
Intelligence Techniques Control a body that can make binding decision 
regarding whether surveillance techniques should be increased.  The French 
law has a lot of details to ensure that this body is independent.  The committee 
requires the equal representation of men and women, it includes two judges, 
and the members have specific term limits.150  It even includes a person who is 
an expert in electronic communications.151  These facts seem to indicate that 
this committee is qualified to make decisions independently, and perhaps they 
should be given more substantive authority to act as a check on the Prime 
Minister’s authority.  This body could act as a judicial authority which could 
afford citizens protection for their fundamental rights because there is some 
additional safeguard in managing their personal information.152 
Another recommendation the European Court of Justice could offer is to 
reprogram the algorithm to consider extremely private information, such as 
conversations between lawyers and their clients, doctors and their patients, 
and journalists and their sources.  The makeup of the algorithm is highly 
sophisticated and largely unknown.  But, perhaps an additional safeguard for 
personal data would be to simply redesign a part of the algorithm so as to 
exclude the processing and collecting of this kind of information.  This 
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would allow French citizens to have greater solace, knowing some personal 
information cannot be collected or used by the French government.  
Finally, the European Court of Justice could advise France not to 
implement its system of mass surveillance, and only use the algorithm to 
collect an individual’s metadata if there is other evidence to suggest this 
individual poses a terrorist threat.  The French government is unlikely to 
favor this option, which would allow it to conduct surveillance measures on a 
small segment of the population.  France would argue this would not afford 
any additional protection beyond the bounds of law before the 
implementation of the Loi Relative au Renseignement.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Balancing interests of freedom and security has been an ongoing issue in 
democracies, and it only gets more complicated with the advent of modern 
technology.  The Loi Relative au Renseignement illustrates this dilemma.  
With the recent attacks on French citizens, it is not surprising that the French 
government feels pressure to protect its people.  It is clear some action must 
be taken in order to protect individuals from terrorist attacks while also 
staying true to the democratic and individualistic values that formed the 
foundations of the modern French government. 
The European Court of Justice will likely be equally concerned with 
maintaining the balance between freedom and security.  Considering all of 
the external resources, however, the court will likely find that the Loi 
Relative au Renseignement comes into significant conflict with the ECFR.  
The text of Articles 7 and 8 of the ECFR, as well as the subsequent case law, 
suggest a broad interpretation of the rights that these Articles offer.   
Another tool the court can use to help make its decision in regard to this 
law is the legislation passed by the European Union.  These documents lay 
out specific criteria in which data can be taken, stored, and used.  They also 
talk about under which circumstances the government can collect 
information without following the recommended criteria.  
Finally, the European Court of Justice will use cases decided by the 
European Court of Human Rights.  The European Court of Human Rights 
holds special value to the European Court of Justice, and their decisions 
should guide the European Court of Justice to the conclusion that France 
should take additional steps to mitigate the negative effects on its citizens’ 
fundamental rights in order to bring France into compliance with its 
European Union obligations. 
